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Abstract
Contextual bandits are online learners that,
given an input, select an arm and receive a
reward for that arm. They use the reward as a
learning signal and aim to maximize the total
reward over the inputs. Contextual bandits
are commonly used to solve recommendation
or ranking problems. This paper considers
a learning setting in which multiple parties
aim to train a contextual bandit together in
a private way: the parties aim to maximize
the total reward but do not want to share
any of the relevant information they possess
with the other parties. Specifically, multiple
parties have access to (different) features that
may benefit the learner but that cannot be
shared with other parties. One of the par-
ties pulls the arm but other parties may not
learn which arm was pulled. One party re-
ceives the reward but the other parties may
not learn the reward value. This paper de-
velops a privacy-preserving contextual bandit
algorithm that combines secure multi-party
computation with a differential private mech-
anism based on epsilon-greedy exploration in
contextual bandits.
1 Introduction
Contextual bandits are an important learning paradigm
used by many recommendation systems (Langford and
Zhang, 2008). The paradigm considers a series of in-
teractions between the learner and the environment:
in each interaction, the learner receives a context fea-
ture and selects an arm based on that context. The
environment provides the learner with a reward after
the arm is pulled (i.e., an action is executed). In tra-
ditional contextual bandit scenarios, the learner is a
∗Denotes equal contribution.
single party : that is, the party that pulls the arm is also
the party who has access to all context features and
who receives the reward. In many practical scenarios,
however, contextual bandit learning involves multiple
parties: for example, recommendation systems gener-
ally involve content producers, content consumers, and
the party that operates the recommendation service
itself. These parties may not be willing or allowed to
share all the information with each other that is needed
to produce good recommendations. For instance, a
travel-recommendation service could recommend bet-
ter itineraries by taking prior airline bookings, hotel
reservations, and airline and hotel reviews into account
as context. To do so, the travel-recommendation service
requires data from booking, reservation, and review sys-
tems that may be operated by other parties. Similarly,
a restaurant-recommendation service may be improved
by considering a user’s prior reservations made via a
restaurant-reservation service.
In this paper, we develop a privacy-preserving contex-
tual bandit that successfully learns in such settings.
We study a multi-party contextual bandit setting in
which: (1) all parties may provide some of the context
features but none of the parties may learn each other’s
features, (2) the party that pulls the arm is the only
one who may know which arm was pulled, and (3) the
party that receives the reward is the only one who
may observe the reward value. To learn effectively, our
algorithm combines techniques from secure multi-party
computation (Ben-Or et al., 1988) and differential pri-
vacy (Dwork et al., 2006). It achieves a high degree
of privacy with limited losses in prediction accuracy
by exploiting the fact that exploration mechanisms in
contextual bandits already provide differential privacy.
We provide theoretical guarantees on the privacy of our
algorithm and empirically demonstrate its efficacy.
2 Problem Statement
Learning setting. We consider a multi-party con-
textual bandit setting with parties P, arms A, and T
iterations. Each iteration, t, of the contextual-bandit
learner comprises three main stages:
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1. Each party p ∈ P provides context features xt,p ∈
RDp in a privacy-preserving way.
2. Party p′ /∈ P pulls arm at ∈ A without revealing at
to any of the other parties.
3. Party p′′ /∈ P receives reward rt ∈ R without reveal-
ing rt to any of the other parties.
The parties collaborate with the aim of learning a
joint policy pi(xt,1, . . . ,xt,|P|) ∈ Π that maximizes the
average reward over all T iterations:
V (pi) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
rt|pi(xt,1, . . . ,xt,|P|),xt,1, . . . ,xt,|P|
]
,
where the expectation is over randomness in the en-
vironment. Our algorithm comes with a theoretical
bound on the regret : the difference between the total
reward obtained taking the best action at each iteration
and that obtained following policy pit ∈ Π.
Our policy set, Π, is the set of all models with a linear
relation between context features xt,p and the corre-
sponding score for arm at (Li et al., 2010). In particular,
let xt ∈ RD be the concatenated context features of all
|P| parties. To compute the score for arm a at iteration
t we use a linear model sa = w>a xt. Let Xa be the
Nt×D design matrix at iteration t which consists of the
Nt context vectors corresponding to arm a. Similarly,
ra ∈ RNt is the vector of observed rewards for the same
arm. The weights at iteration t are found by minimiz-
ing the least-squares objective ‖Xawa− ra‖22 using the
standard linear least-squares solution: wa = W−1a ba
where Wa = X>aXa and ba = X>a ra.
Security model. In line with the cooperative nature
of our learning setting, we assume an honest-but-curious
security model (Goldreich, 2009): we assume parties do
not collude and follow the specified algorithm, but may
try and learn as much as possible from the information
they observe when executing the algorithm.
Our algorithm comes with a differential-privacy guar-
antee on the information that parties p′ and p′′ can
obtain on context features ∀p ∈ P : xt,p. The action
must be revealed to party p′ so that they can pull the
corresponding arm. Similarly, party p′′ must receive the
reward. Hence, some information is ultimately revealed
to parties p and p′′. We provide a differential-privacy
guarantee on this information leakage by exploiting the
randomness introduced by epsilon-greedy exploration.
The other parties, p ∈ P, do not learn anything about
context features xt,q for which q 6= p. The algorithm
assumes that all parties have access to privately shared
random numbers generated during an off-line phase.1
1These can be generated by a trusted third party or a
leveled HE implementation (Brakerski et al., 2012).
3 Privacy-Preserving
Contextual Bandits
Our privacy-preserving contextual bandit learner em-
ploys a relatively standard epsilon-greedy policy that
assumes a linear relation between the context features
and the score for an arm. To obtain privacy guarantees,
we use arithmetic secret sharing techniques commonly
used in secure multi-party computation (MPC) to im-
plement our algorithm (Damgård et al., 2011). We rely
on the differentially private properties of epsilon-greedy
policies when performing actions (see Section 4).
In arithmetic secret sharing, a scalar value x ∈ Z/QZ
(where Z/QZ denotes a ring with Q elements, and Q is
large) is shared across |P| parties in such a way that the
sum of the shares reconstructs the original value x. We
denote the sharing of x by [x] = {∀p ∈ P : [x]p}, where
[x]p ∈ Z/QZ indicates party p’s share of x. The repre-
sentation has the property that
∑
p∈P [x]p mod Q=x.
We use a simple encoding to represent the real-valued
context features and model weights in Z/QZ: to obtain
x, we multiply xR ∈ R with a large scaling factor B
and rounding to the nearest integer: x = bBxRe, where
B = 2L for some precision parameter, L. We decode an
encoded value, x, by computing xR ≈ x/B. Encoding
real-valued numbers this way incurs a precision loss
that is inversely proportional to L.
Party p shares a context feature x by drawing |P| − 1
numbers uniformly at random from Z/QZ and dis-
tributes them among the other parties. These form the
shares ∀q 6= p : [x]q for |P| − 1 parties. Subsequently,
party p computes its own share as [x]p = x−
∑
q 6=p[x]q.
As a result, none of the other parties can infer any
information about x from their share. To allow party
p′ to pull an arm at ∈ A, all parties communicate their
shares to party p′, which computes at =
∑
p∈|P|[at]p
and performs the corresponding action, at. Subse-
quently, party p′′ receives the reward, rt.
Algorithm 1 describes our privacy-preserving contex-
tual bandit learner. All the computations in the al-
gorithm are performed by the parties directly in the
secret-shared representation without leaking informa-
tion to the other parties. All computations on shares
are performed modulus Q.
We rely on the homomorphic properties of additive se-
cret sharing in order to perform computations directly
on the encrypted data. Below, we give an overview
of how these computations are implemented. The pri-
mary cost in executing Algorithm 1 is the number
of communication rounds needed between parties for
certain operations, for example, the evaluation of the
argmax function. We note that this communication
can sometimes be overlapped with other computations.
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Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving contextual bandit learner.
Input:
- Exploration parameter, .
- Party p′ /∈ P that pulls arms; party p′′ /∈ P that receives rewards.
- Set of parties, P; set of arms, A; number of context features produced by all parties, D.
- A store of Beaver triples and private (Bernoulli and uniform) samples generated off-line.
Output: Secretly shared weights, [W], and biases, [B].
1 Party p′ initializes weights W = {W1, . . . ,W|A|} with Wa ← ID×D.
2 Party p′ initializes biases B = {b1, . . . ,b|A|} with ba ← 0D×1.
3 Party p′ secretly shares weights [W] = {[W1], . . . , [W|A|]} and biases [B] = {[b1], . . . , [b|A|]}.
4 foreach t ∈ {1, . . . , T} do
5 Parties observe context features ∀p ∈ P : xt,p ∈ RDp (with
∑
p∈P Dp = D).
6 Parties secretly share context features ∀p ∈ P : [xt,p].
7 Parties concatenate shares ∀p ∈ P : [xt,p] into single share [xt] with xt ∈ RD.
8 Select next private sample [yt] with yt ∼ Bernoulli().
9 foreach a ∈ A do
10 Compute [wa]← [W−1a ba] (weights for arm a).
11 Compute [st,a]← [w>a xt] (score for arm a).
12 Select next random private sample [va] with va ∼ Uniform(0, 1).
13 Compute [s˜t,a]← [ytva + (1− yt)st,a] (differentially private score for arm a).
14 end
15 Compute [at]← [argmaxa s˜t,a] (arm to be pulled).
16 Party p′ opens up at and pulls arm.
17 Party p′ constructs ∀a ∈ A : oa ← I(a = at) (binary values indicating selected action).
18 Party p′ secretly shares all indicator variables, ∀a ∈ A : [oa].
19 Party p′′ receives reward rt and secretly shares [rt].
20 foreach a ∈ A do
21 Compute [Wa]← [Wa + oaxtx>t ].
22 Compute [ba]← [ba + oartxt].
23 end
24 end
Addition. The addition of two encrypted values, [z] =
[x] + [y], can be trivially implemented by having each
party p sum their shares of [x] and [y]. That is, each
party p ∈ P computes [z]p ← [x]p + [y]p.
Multiplication. To facilitate multiplication of two
secret shared values, the parties use random Beaver
triples (Beaver, 1991) that were generated in an off-line
preprocessing phase. A Beaver triple of secret shared
values ([a], [b], [c]) satisfies the property c= ab. The
parties use the Beaver triple to compute [α] = [x]− [a]
and [β] = [y]− [b] and decrypt α and β. This does not
leak information if a and b were drawn uniformly at
random from the ring Z/QZ. The product [x][y] can
now be evaluated by computing [c] + α[b] + β[a] + αβ.
It is straightforward to confirm that the result of the
private multiplication is correct:
[c] + α[b] + β[a] + αβ =
[a][b]+ [x][b]− [a][b]+ [y][a]− [b][a]+([x]− [a])([y]− [b])
= [x][y].
Decrypting α and β requires a round of communica-
tion among all parties: a communication round. The
required correction for the additional scaling term, B,
incurs a second communication round.
Square. To compute the square [x2], the parties use
a Beaver pair ([a], [b]) such that b=a2. As before, the
parties then compute [α] = [x] − [a], decrypt α, and
obtain the result via [x2] = [b] + 2α[a] + α2.
Dot product, matrix-vector, and matrix-matrix
multiplication. The operations on scalars we de-
scribed above can readily be used to perform opera-
tions on vectors and matrices that are secret-shared in
element-wise fashion. Specifically, dot products com-
bine multiple element-wise multiplications and addi-
tions. Matrix-vector and matrix-matrix multiplication
is implemented by repeated computation of dot prod-
ucts of two arithmetically secret-shared vectors.
Matrix inverse. At each round, the algorithm com-
putes |A| matrix inverses of the D×D matrices Wa
(in line 10), which is computationally costly. Because
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Algorithm 2: Privacy-preserving identification of all
maximum elements in a secret-shared vector.
Input: An arithmetically secret-shared vector [x].
Output: A secret shared vector [y] ∈ {0, 1}|A| with
ones indicating the maximum values in [x].
1 foreach i, j ∈ A×A do
2 Compute [`i,j ]← [xi ≥ xj ].
3 end
4 Set [y]← [1].
5 foreach i ∈ A do
6 foreach j ∈ A do
7 Compute [yi]← [yi][`i,j ].
8 end
9 end
we only perform rank-one updates of each Wa matrix,
we can maintain a representation of W−1a instead, ren-
dering the matrix inversion in line 10 superfluous, and
use the Sherman-Morrison formula (Bartlett, 1951) to
perform the update in line 21:
[
W−1a
]← [W−1a − oaW−1a xtx>t W−1a
1 + x>t W
−1
a xt
]
. (1)
This expression comprises only multiplications, addi-
tions, and a reciprocal (see below).
Reciprocal. We compute the reciprocal [1/x] us-
ing a Newton-Rhapson approximation with iterates
[xt+1] ←
[
2xt − xx2t
]
. The Newton-Rhapson approx-
imation converges rapidly when x0 is initialized well.
The reciprocal is only used in the Sherman-Morrison
formula, so we choose the initialization with this in
mind. Because W−1a in Equation 1 is the inverse of
a positive-definite matrix, it is itself positive definite;
the denominator in Equation 1, therefore, lies in the
range [1, c] (in our experiments, we empirically find
c < 10). Empirically, we found that an initial value of
x0 = 3e
−(x−0.5) + 0.003 works well in this range.
Exponential. We note that ex = limn→∞
(
1 + xn
)n.
We approximate this quantity by setting n= 2k and
evaluating the following expression for k=8:
[ex] =
[(
1 +
x
2k
)2k]
.
Herein, we can efficiently compute
[
x2
k
]
in k rounds
by repeatedly squaring the intermediate result.
Argmax. We compute the index of the maximum
value of a vector [x] where x ∈ (Z/QZ)|A| as a one-
hot vector of the same dimension. The algorithm for
evaluating the argmax has three main stages:
1. Use Algorithm 2 to construct a vector [y] of the
same length as [x] that contains ones at the indices
of all maximum values of [x] and zeros elsewhere.
2. Break ties in [y] by multiplying it element-wise with
a random permutation of {1, . . . , |A|}. This permu-
tation, [γ], is generated and securely shared off-line.
3. Use Algorithm 2 to construct a one-hot vector [z]
that indicates the maximum value of [y ◦ γ].
The permutation in step 2 randomly breaks ties for the
index of the maximum value. We opt for random tie-
breaking because breaking ties deterministically may
leak information. For example, if ties were broken by
always selecting the last maximum value, the adversary
would learn that [x] did not have multiple maximum
values if it observed a [z] that has 1 as its first element.
In Algorithm 2, the evaluation of all [xi ≥ xj ] terms
is performed on a binary secret share of xi and xj .
A binary secret share is a is a special type of arith-
metic secret sharing for binary data in which the ring
size Q = 2 (Goldreich et al., 1987). To convert an
arithmetic share [x] into a binary share 〈x〉, each party
first secretly shares its arithmetic share with the other
parties and then performs addition of the resulting
shares. To construct the binary share 〈[x]p〉 of its
arithmetic share [x]p, party p ∈ P: (1) draws |P| − 1
random bit strings 〈[x]p〉q and shares those with the
other parties and (2) computes its own binary share
〈[x]p〉p =
⊕
q 6=p〈[x]p〉q. The parties now each obtained
a binary share of [x]p without having to decrypt x.
This process is repeated for each party p ∈ P to create
binary shares of all |P| arithmetic shares [x]p. Subse-
quently, the parties compute 〈x〉 = ∑p∈P〈[x]p〉. The
summation is implemented by Ripple-carry adder in
log2(|P| log2Q) rounds (Catrina and De Hoogh, 2010).
Subsequently, the [xi ≥ xj ] operation is performed by
computing [y] ← [xi] − [xj ], constructing the binary
secret sharing 〈y〉 per the procedure outlined above,
obtaining the most significant bits, 〈y〉(MSB), and con-
verting those bits back to an arithmetic share. To
convert from a binary share 〈y〉 to an arithmetic share
[y], the parties compute [y] =
∑B
b=1 2
b
[〈y〉(b)], where
〈y〉(b) contains the b-th bits of the binary share 〈y〉 and
B is the total number of bits in the shared secret. To
create the arithmetic share of a bit,
[〈y〉(b)], each party
p ∈ P draws numbers uniformly at random from {0, 1}
and shares the difference between their bits and the
random numbers with the other parties. The parties
sum all resulting shares to obtain
[〈y〉(b)] = [xi ≥ xj ].
Overall, the evaluation of [xi ≥ xj ] requires seven com-
munication rounds. We parallelize the reduction over
i, and perform the reduction over j using a binary re-
duction tree in dlog2 (|A| − 1)e communication rounds.
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Figure 1: Average reward (over 10 runs) of privacy-
preserving contextual bandits during training for four
different values of . Shaded regions indicate the stan-
dard deviation across runs.
4 Privacy Guarantee
The privacy guarantees for our algorithm rely on: (1)
well-known guarantees on the security of arithmetic
and binary secret sharing mechanisms and (2) the dif-
ferentially private opening of actions at ∈ A by party
p′. For security guarantees of secret sharing, we refer
the reader to Damgård et al. (2011). We focus on the
differentially private opening of actions. Our primary
observation is a natural link between epsilon-greedy
exploration and differential privacy in Theorem 1.
A mechanism M is η-differentially private if for all
datasets D and D′ that differ by a single example,
and for all output sets S ⊆ Range(M), the following
condition holds (Dwork, 2011):
P (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eηP (M(D′) ∈ S).
Theorem 1. If only the selected action at ∈ A
at round t is revealed, then -greedy exploration is
log(|A|/)-differentially private.
Proof. The probability of selecting the action that
corresponds to the maximum score is given by
P (pi(s) = argmaxa∈A sa) = (1− ) + |A| . We use this
probability to bound the privacy loss, η:
log
P (pi(s) = j | j = argmaxa∈A sa)
P (pi(s) = k | k 6= argmaxa∈A sa)
= log
1− + /|A|
/|A|
= log
( |A|

− |A|+ 1
)
≤ log
( |A|

)
.
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Figure 2: Average reward as a function of differential
privacy, η = log(|A|/). The differential privacy of the
algorithm decreases as η increases; the value η = ∞
corresponds to the non-private version of the algorithm.
Using the fact that the exploration parameter  ∈ [0, 1],
we also observe that:
log
P (pi(s) = j | j 6= argmaxa∈A sa)
P (pi(s) = k | k = argmaxa∈A sa)
= log
/|A|
1− + /|A|
= log
(

(1− )|A|+ 
)
≤ log 1 = 0.
To complete the proof, we observe that:
log
P (pi(s) = j | j 6= argmaxa∈A sa)
P (pi(s) = k | k 6= argmaxa∈A sa)
= log
/|A|
/|A| = 0.
The above result is a generalization of the randomized
response protocol (Warner, 1965) to |A| > 2 arms and
arbitrary  ∈ [0, 1]. Because the privacy loss grows
logarithmically with the number of actions, we obtain
differentially private action selection for reasonable
settings of the exploration parameter .
5 Experiments
We perform experiments on the MNIST dataset to
evaluate the efficiency and reward-privacy trade-off
of our algorithm. We reduce the data dimensionality
by projecting each digit image to the first 20 princi-
pal components of the dataset, and normalize each
resulting vector to have unit length. We perform a
single sweep through the 60, 000 images in the MNIST
training set. At each iteration, the parties receive a
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Figure 3: Run-time of Algorithm 1 as a function of
the number of arms, |A|. Each line corresponds to a
different number of parties, |P|.
new secret-shared image and need to select one of 10
arms (digit classes). The reward is 1 if the selected
arm corresponds to the correct digit class, and 0 other-
wise. We implement Algorithm 1 on a ring Z/QZ with
Q=264. We rely on the property of 64-bit integer oper-
ations, where a result that is too large to fit in 64 bits
is automatically mapped to Z/QZ with Q= 264. We
use 20 bits of precision to encode floating-point values
into Z/QZ (see supplemental material) and 7 Newton-
Rhapson iterations for computing the reciprocal. Most
of our experiments are performed using |P|= 2 par-
ties. Code reproducing the results of our experiments
is available from http://www.anonymized.com.
Reward and privacy. Figure 1 shows the average re-
ward that our private contextual bandits obtain during
its sweep over the data set for four different values of .
We compared the results obtained by our algorithm to
that of a “plain-text” implementation of epsilon-greedy
contextual bandits, and confirmed that the observed
rewards are the same for a range of  values.
Figure 2 shows the average reward (averaged over 5
runs) observed as a function of the differential privacy
parameter, η (higher values represent less privacy).
The results were obtained by varying  and are shown
for experiments with three different dataset sizes, T .
The results show that at certain levels of differential
privacy, the reward obtained by the private algorithm is
higher than that of its non-private counterpart (η=∞).
Indeed, some amount of exploration benefits the learner
whilst also providing differential privacy. For higher
levels of privacy, however, the reward obtained starts
to decrease rapidly because too much exploration is
needed to obtain the required level of privacy.
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Figure 4: Run-time of Algorithm 1 as a function of
the number of parties, |P|. Each line corresponds to a
different number of arms, |A|.
Efficiency and scale. Table 1 reports the run-time
of the key operations in Algorithm 1, compared to an
implementation of the same operations in PyTorch. In
our experiments, the private contextual-bandit imple-
mentation with |P|=2 parties and |A|=10 actions is
nearly 500× slower than a regular implementation. In
real-world settings, the slow-down would likely be even
higher because of network latency: our experiments
were performed on a single machine where each party
is implemented as a separate process. There are two
fundamental sources of inefficiency in Algorithm 1:
1. The weight update is O(1) in a regular contextual-
bandit implementation (only the weights for the se-
lected arm are updated) but O(|A|) in Algorithm 1:
the private implementation cannot reveal the se-
lected arm to other parties and, therefore, has to
update all the weights. Fortunately, these weight
updates are trivially parallelizable over arms.
2. Some operations (e.g., reciprocal and argmax) re-
quire additional computation and communication.
Table 1: Performance characteristics of key operations
in Algorithm 1 (for |P|=2 and |A|=100): number of
communication rounds between parties (left) and slow-
down compared to a regular implementation (right).
Operation Rounds Slowdown
Addition 0 11×
Multiplication 2 380×
Reciprocal 30 6, 000×
Argmax O (|P|+ log2(|A|)) 34, 000×
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Figure 5: Average reward as a function of differential
privacy, η = log(|A|/) for a variable number of arms,
|A|. Privacy decreases as η increases; the value η =∞
corresponds to the non-private version of the algorithm.
We also perform experiments in which we vary the
number of arms, |A|. To increase the number of arms,
we construct a K-means clustering of the dataset and
set |A|=K. We define the rewards to be Bernoulli-
distributed with P (ra= 1) =νa. The probabilities νa
are Gaussian-kernel values based on the distances from
a data point to the inferred clusters: νa ∝ e− 12σ ‖ca−x‖2 ,
where ca is the a-th cluster and σ is used to control
the difficulty of the problem. We set σ=1/2 in our ex-
periments. Figure 3 demonstrates how the contextual-
bandit algorithm scales with the number of arms. For
small numbers of arms (|A| ≤ 20), the implementation
overhead dominates the computation time. For larger
numbers of arms (|A| ≥ 40), we observe quadratic
scaling in the number of arms. Figure 4 shows how
the algorithm scales as a function of the number of
parties, |P|. The results illustrate that the run-time
of our algorithm is O(|P|2): all parties communicate
with each other in every communication round, which
leads to the quadratic scaling observed.
Figure 5 presents result that demonstrate how the
reward changes as a function of the privacy loss η when
the number of arms, |A|, is varied. The results show
that the privacy loss increases logarithmically in the
number of arms, but that the amount of exploration
needed also increases. As a result, the optimal privacy
loss in terms of reward only tends to increase slightly
as the number of arms in the bandit increases. Indeed,
this increase may be prohibitively large for web-scale
recommendation applications in which the bandit has
to select one arm out of millions of arms.
Membership inference attacks. To empirically
measure the privacy of our contextual-bandit algorithm,
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Figure 6: Average accuracy (over 200 runs) of
membership-inference attacks (Yeom et al., 2018) on
our bandit algorithm at different stages of training, for
four different values of exploration variable .
we also performed experiments in which an adversary
tries to infer whether or not a sample was part of the
training dataset by applying the membership inference
attack of Yeom et al. (2018) on model checkpoints
saved at various points during training. The member-
ship inference attack computes an empirical estimate
of the joint action-reward distribution on the data that
was used to train the model and on a held-out test set,
respectively (we use the MNIST test set as held-out
set). We use the resulting ptrain(r | a) and ptest(r | a)
to infer training-data membership for an example xT+1.
Specifically, we: (1) evaluate the model on xT+1, (2) ob-
serve the selected arm aT+1, (3) receive corresponding
reward rT+1, and (4) predict training data membership
if ptrain(rT+1 | aT+1) > ptest(rT+1, | aT+1).
Following Yeom et al. (2018), we measure the advantage
of the adversary: the difference in the true positive rate
and the false positive rate in predicting training set
membership. The adversary advantage during training
is shown in Figure 6 for models trained with different
values of . The results show that in the early stages
of learning, the adversary has a slight advantage of
1–2%, this advantage rapidly decreases below 0.75%
after the learner has observed more training examples2.
The advantage slightly increases in the later stages of
training: interestingly, this happens because the model
slightly underfits on the MNIST dataset. Overall, the
empirical results suggest that our contextual bandit
learner is, indeed, maintaining privacy well in practice.
2For higher values of , there is more variance in the
model parameters during training, which is reflected in
higher variance in the advantage values.
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6 Related Work
This study fits into a larger body of work on privacy-
preserving machine learning. Prior work has used sim-
ilar techniques from secure multi-party computation
(and homomorphic encryption) for secure evaluation
and/or training of deep networks (Dowlin et al., 2016;
Hynes et al., 2018; Juvekar et al., 2018; Mohassel and
Zhang, 2017; Riazi et al., 2017; Shokri and Shmatikov,
2015; Wagh et al., 2018) and has developed secure data-
aggregation techniques (Bonawitz et al., 2017) for use
in federated-learning scenarios (Bonawitz et al., 2019).
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
use this family of techniques in online learning, using
the randomness introduced by exploration mechanisms
to obtain a differential-privacy guarantee on the output
produced by the learner.
Most closely related to our work are studies on dif-
ferential private online learning (Dwork et al., 2010;
Jain et al., 2012; Thakurta and Smith, 2013). In par-
ticular, Mishra and Thakurta (2015) develops UCB
and Thompson samplers for (non-contextual) bandits
with differential-privacy guarantees based on tree-based
aggregation (Chan et al., 2010; Dwork et al., 2009).
Follow-up work improved differentially private UCB to
have better regret bounds (Tossou and Dimitrakakis,
2016). Recent work (Shariff and Sheffet, 2018) also
developed a joint differentially private version of Lin-
UCB (Li et al., 2010). In contrast to those prior stud-
ies, we study a more challenging setting in which the
parties that implement the learner may not leak in-
formation about their observed contexts, actions, and
rewards to each other. Having said that, our algorithm
may be improved using the differentially private mech-
anisms of Mishra and Thakurta (2015); Tossou and
Dimitrakakis (2016). In this study, we opted for the
simpler epsilon-greedy mechanism because it can be
implemented efficiently on arithmetically shared data.
We leave the implementation of differentially private
UCB and Thompson samplers in our secure multi-party
computation framework to future work.
7 Discussion and Future Work
We presented a privacy-preserving contextual bandit
algorithm that works correctly in practice and that
comes with theoretical guarantees on (differential) pri-
vacy. Although our experimental evaluation of this
algorithm demonstrates its effectiveness, several av-
enues for improvement of our algorithm remain:
• Increase numerical stability. Repeated use of
the Sherman-Morrison formula is known to produce
cancellation errors that may lead to numerical insta-
bilities. A numerically stable version of our algorithm
would regularly compute the actual matrix inverse to
eliminate such errors, and add a diagonal-regularizer
to prevent numerical issues due to ill-conditioning.
• Robustness to disappearing parties. In many
practical settings, parties may temporarily disappear
because of system failures (Bonawitz et al., 2019). To
allow the learning algorithm to continue to operate in
such scenarios, different types of secret sharing (e.g.,
Shamir sharing (Shamir, 1979)) may be needed. The
contextual bandit itself could learn to be robust to
failing parties by employing a kind of “party dropout”
at training time (Srivastava et al., 2014).
• Security under stricter security models. The
current algorithm assumes parties are honest-but-
curious, which means that parties do not deviate
from the protocol in Algorithm 1. It is important
to note that out privacy guarantees do not hold in
stricter security models in which one or more parties
operate adversarially or in settings in which the par-
ties collude. Our current algorithm can be extended
to provide guarantees under stricter security models:
for instance, extending the algorithm to use message
authentication codes (Goldreich, 2009) would allow
the parties to detect attacks in which a minority
of the parties behaves adversarially. Unfortunately,
such extensions generally increase the computational
and communication requirements of the learner.
• Robustness to timing attacks. In practical sce-
narios, there is a delay between making the action
and receiving the reward. This may affect the learner
in that the parameter-update stage operates on differ-
ent parameters than were used during the prediction
stage. More importantly, it makes the learner sus-
ceptible to timing attacks (Kocher, 1996): if the
distribution of reward delays depends on the action
being selected, parties p ∈ P may be able to infer the
selected action from the observed time delay, counter
to our guarantees. A real-world implementation of
our algorithm should, therefore, introduce random
time delays in the operations performed by parties
p′ and p′′ to prevent information leakage.
• Stronger membership-inference attacks. The
membership-inference attacks we considered in this
study (Yeom et al., 2018) are not designed to use
the full action-reward sequence as side information
in the attack. It may thus be possible to strengthen
these membership-inference attacks by using the full
action-reward sequence, which may be observed by
an external observer of the algorithm. The develop-
ment of such stronger attacks may help to obtain
better empirical insights into the level of privacy pro-
vided by our privacy-preserving contextual bandits.
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A Secret Sharing
Our privacy-preserving contextual bandits use two dif-
ferent types of secret sharing: (1) arithmetic secret
sharing Damgård et al. (2011); and (2) binary secret
sharing Goldreich et al. (1987). Below, we describe the
secret sharing methods for single values x but they can
trivially be extended to real-valued vectors x.
Arithmetic secret sharing. Arithmetic secret shar-
ing is a type of secret sharing in which the sum of the
shares reconstruct the original data x. We refer to the
shared representation of x as [x]. The shared representa-
tion across parties, P , is given by [x] = {∀p ∈ P : [x]p},
where [x]p indicates the share of x that party p ∈ P has.
The representation has the property that
∑
p∈P [x]p
mod Q=x. To make sure that none of the parties can
learn any information about x from their share [x]p,
shares need to be sampled uniformly from a ring of
size Q, Z/QZ, and all computations on shares must
be performed modulus Q. If x is real-valued, it is en-
coded to lie in Z/QZ using the mechanism described
in Appendix B before it is encrypted.
To encrypt the unencrypted data x, party p that pos-
sesses x draws |P| − 1 numbers uniformly at random
from Z/QZ and distributes them among the other par-
ties. Subsequently, party p computes its own share as
[x]p = x −
∑
q 6=p[x]q. Thus all the parties (including
party p) obtain a random number that is uniformly
distributed over the ring, from which they cannot infer
any information about x. To decrypt [x], the parties
communicate their shares and compute x =
∑
p∈P [x]p
mod Q.
Binary secret sharing. Binary secret sharing is a
special type of arithmetic secret sharing for binary
data in which the ring size Q = 2 (Goldreich et al.,
1987). Because addition modulo two is equivalent to
taking an exclusive OR (XOR) of the bits, this type of
sharing is often referred to as XOR secret sharing. To
distinguish binary shares from arithmetic shares, we
denote a binary share of variable x across P parties by
〈x〉 = {∀p ∈ P : 〈x〉p}. Just as with arithmetic sharing,
binary secret shares allow for “linear” operations on bits
without decryption. For example, binary sharing allows
for the evaluation of any circuit expressed as XOR and
AND gates. While it is much more efficient to do
addition and multiplication of integers with arithmetic
shares, logical expressions such as max(0, x) are more
efficient to compute with binary shares. In equations,
we denote AND by ⊗ and XOR by ⊕.
To encrypt the unencrypted bit x, party p ∈ P
that possesses x draws |P| − 1 random bits and dis-
tributes those among the other parties. These form
the shares ∀q 6= p : 〈x〉q for |P| − 1 parties. Sub-
sequently, party p ∈ P computes its own share as
〈x〉p = x⊕
(⊕
q 6=p〈x〉q
)
. Thus all the parties (includ-
ing party p) obtain a random bit from which they
cannot infer any information about x.
A.1 Converting Between Secret-Sharing
Types
Contextual bandit algorithms involve both functions
that are easier to compute on arithmetic secret shares
(e.g., matrix multiplication) and functions that are
easier to implement via on binary secret shares (e.g.,
argmax) using binary circuits. Therefore, we use both
types of secret sharing and convert between the two
types using the techniques proposed in Demmler et al.
(2015).
From [x] to 〈x〉: To convert from an arithmetic share
[x] to a binary share 〈x〉, each party first secretly shares
its arithmetic share with the other parties and then
performs addition of the resulting shares. To construct
the binary share 〈[x]p〉 of its arithmetic share [x]p, party
p ∈ P : (1) draws |P|−1 random bit strings 〈[x]p〉q and
shares those with the other parties and (2) computes its
own binary share 〈[x]p〉p =
⊕
q 6=p〈[x]p〉q. The parties
now each obtained a binary share of [x]p without having
to decrypt x. This process is repeated for each party
p ∈ P to create binary secret shares of all |P| arithmetic
shares [x]p. Subsequently, the parties compute 〈x〉 =∑
p∈P〈[x]p〉. The summation is implemented by Ripple-
carry adder that can be evaluated in log2(|P| log2Q)
rounds Catrina and De Hoogh (2010); Damgård et al.
(2005).
From 〈x〉 to [x]: To convert from a binary share
〈x〉 to an arithmetic share [x], the parties compute
[x] =
∑B
b=1 2
b
[〈x〉(b)], where 〈x〉(b) denotes the b-th
bit of the binary share 〈x〉 and B is the total number
of bits in the shared secret. To create the arithmetic
share of a bit,
[〈x〉(b)], each party p ∈ P draws a
number uniformly at random from {0, 1} and shares
the difference between their bit and the random number
with the other parties. The parties sum all resulting
shares to obtain
[〈x〉(b)].
A.2 Logical Operations and the
Sign Function
We rely on binary secret sharing to implement logical
operations and the sign function.
XOR and AND. XOR and AND are addition and
multiplication modulo 2 where the numbers belong
to the set {0, 1} — they are the binary operations in
Z2. As a result, the techniques we use for addition
and multiplication of arithmetically shared values (see
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paper) can be used to implement XOR and AND as
well. Evaluating 〈x〉⊕ a function amounts to one party
p ∈ P computing 〈x〉p ⊕ a, and evaluating 〈x〉 ⊕ 〈y〉
amounts to each party p ∈ P computing 〈x〉p ⊕ 〈y〉p.
Similarly, 〈x〉 ⊗ a is evaluated by having each party
compute 〈x〉p⊗a. The AND operation between two pri-
vate values, 〈x〉〈y〉, is implemented akin to the private
multiplication protocol using Beaver triples.
Sign function. We express the sign function on an
arithmetically shared value as [x ≥ 0]. Using this
expression, the sign function can be implemented by
first converting the arithmetic share, [x], to a binary
share, 〈x〉, using the conversion procedure described
above. Subsequently, we obtain the most significant
bit, 〈x〉(MSB), and convert it back to an arithmetic
share to obtain [x ≥ 0].
B Fixed-Precision Encoding
Contextual bandit algorithms generally use real-valued
parameters and data. Therefore, we need to encode the
real-valued numbers as integers before we can arithmeti-
cally share them. We do so by multiplying x ∈ R with
a large scaling factor B and rounding to the nearest
integer: xˆ = bBxe, where B = 2L for some precision
parameter, L. We decode an encoded value, xˆ, by com-
puting x = xˆ/B. Encoding real-valued numbers this
way incurs a precision loss that is inversely proportional
to L.
Since we scale by a factor B= 2L to encode floating-
point numbers, we must scale down by a factor 2L
after every multiplication. We do this using the public
division protocol described in Appendix C.
C Public Division
A simple method to divide an arithmetically shared
value, [x], by a public value, `, would simply divide
the share of each party by `). However, such a method
can produce incorrect results when the sum of shares
“wraps around” the ring size, Q. Defining θx to be
the number of wraps such that x =
∑
p∈P [x]p − θxQ,
indeed, we observe that:
x
`
=
∑
p∈P
[x]p
`
− θx
`
Q 6=
∑
p∈P
[x]p
`
− θxQ.
Therefore, the simple division method fails when θx 6= 0,
which happens with probability P (θx 6= 0) = xQ in the
two-party case. Many prior MPC implementations spe-
cialize to the |P| = 2 case and rely on this probability
being negligible Mohassel and Zhang (2017); Riazi et al.
(2017); Wagh et al. (2018). However, when |P| > 2
the probability of failure grows rapidly and we must
account for the number of wraps, θx.
Algorithm 3: Private computation of the number of
wraps in an arithmetically shared value.
Input:
- Arithmetically secret-shared value, [x].
- A store of random numbers and the number of wraps
in those numbers generated off-line.
Output: Arithmetic sharing of the number of wraps
in [x], denoted by [θx].
1 Select next random number, [r], and the number of
wraps [θr] in [r].
2 [z]← [x] + [r]
3 foreach p ∈ P do
4 Party p computes βxprp from [x]p and [r]p such
that [z]p = [x]p + [r]p − βxprpQ.
5 end
6 Parties construct arithmetic sharing,
[βxr] = {∀p ∈ P : [β]p}.
7 Parties decrypt [z] to obtain z (note that z contains
no information about x).
8 Parties compute number of wraps in z, θz.
9 Parties compute [ηxr]← z < [r].
10 Parties compute [θx]← θz + [βxr]− [θr]− [ηxr]
(number of wraps in [x]).
We do so by privately computing a secret share of the
number of wraps in x, [θx], using Algorithm 3. We use
[θx] to compute the correct value of the division by `:
x
`
= [z]− [θx]Q
`
where [z] =
{
∀p ∈ P : [x]p
`
}
.
In practice, it can be difficult to compute [ηxr] in Al-
gorithm 3 (line 8). We note that ηxr has a fixed prob-
ability of being non-zero, irrespective of whether the
number of parties is two or larger, i.e., regardless of
the number of parties P (ηxr 6= 0) = xQ . In practice,
we therefore skip the computation of [ηxr] and simply
set ηxr = 0. This implies that incorrect results can be
produced by our algorithm with small probability. For
example, when we multiply two real-values, xˆ and yˆ,
the result will be encoded as B2xˆyˆ which has probabil-
ity B
2xˆyˆ
Q of producing an error. This probability can
be reduced by increasing Q or reducing the precision
parameter, B.
D Numerical Precision
In addition to the experiments presented in the paper,
we also performed experiments to measure the impact
of varying the precision in the fixed-point encoding and
the numerical approximations. Figure 7 shows the av-
erage reward as a function of the bits of precision used
in encoding of floating-point values. The optimal pre-
cision is 20 bits with a sharp drop in reward obtained
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Figure 7: Average reward as a function of the bits of
precision, L, used to encode floating-point values into
Z/QZ. We multiply values by 2L to encode them as
fixed-point integers in Z/QZ.
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Figure 8: Average reward as a function of the num-
ber of Newton-Rhapson iterations used for privately
computing the reciprocal function (see Section 3 in the
main paper for details).
below 18 and above 22 bits. The drop below 18 bits is
due precision loss causing numerical instability. Algo-
rithm 1 in the main paper is susceptible to three forms
of numerical instability: (1) ill-conditioning due to rely-
ing on the normal equations to solve the least-squares
problem, (2) degeneracies in the matrix W−1a which
can become singular or non-positive-definite, and (3)
cancellation errors due to use of the Sherman-Morrison
update. The drop in observed reward when using more
than 22 bits of precision is due to wrap-around errors
that arise because we do not correctly compute ηxr
(see Section B). This causes public divisions to fail
catastrophically with higher probability, impeding the
accuracy of the learning algorithm.
Figure 8 shows how the average reward changes as a
function of the number of Newton-Rhapson iterations
used to approximate the private reciprocal. The results
reveal that three iterations suffice in our experiments.
We note that the domain of the private reciprocal in
Algorithm 1 in the main paper is [1, c]. In all our
experiments, we observed empirically that c < 10. For
use cases that require a larger range of values, [1, c],
more iterations and a different initial value may be
needed to ensure rapid convergence.
